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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Perth Amboy Smelter & Refinery
Workers Union Local 365
United Steelworkers of America
AFL-CIO
Award
and
American Smelting & Refining Company

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the contract and the
practice thereunder by not assigning carpenters to certain work in connection with the
scale house on November 4, 1969? If so what
shall be the remedy?
There is no doubt that the dismantling or disposal of the
wooden scale house did not require the skill of carpenters. In
terms of skill only laborers were required.
However, the record discloses that by long standing practice, the parties have agreed that where a structure has been
built by carpenters, its disposal or dismantlement has and
shall be the work of carpenters as well, irrespective of the
skill required.
Accordingly, on the basis of this past practice, the dismantling or removal of the wood debris resulting from the destruction of the scale house should have been performed on
November 4 by carpenters.

Therefore a number of carpenters

equivalent to the number of laborers who performed the work
shall be paid on a straight time basis for the amoun^-of time
f

on that day that the laborers did that work.

/'"

Eric J./Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February 22, 1971
STATE OF New York )(ss.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 22nd day of February, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
the be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 484, American Bakery & Confectionery
Workers Union, AFL-CIO (representing the
grievants at and through the first hearing
on October 1, 1971); Local 50, American
Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFLCIO (representing the grievants at and
through the remaining hearings on October
13 and October 15, 1971)

AWARD

-andThe Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc.
National Bakery Division

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly
designated under the Arbitration Agreement between the above
named parties, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the parties makes the following AWARD.
1.

The discharges of P. Budniak, W. O'Brien,
V. Ricciardi, F. McGowan, W. O'Niell,
G. Drowne, P. Cristiano, L. V. Bernacke,
L. Donaldson, E. Brick, J. Giordano and
J. Hill were for just cause and are upheld.

2.

The discharges of J. Walker, W. Campbell,
F. Ducey, L. Testa, J. Zadra, C. Reidlinger,
J. Brennan, Jr., T. Wisniewski, J. F. Ryan,
J. Gehart, J. Conway, and W. Sinner are
reduced to disciplinary suspensions. They
shall be reinstated on Monday, October 18,
1971 without back pay.

Eric /f. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED
October 20, 1971
STATE OF
New York)ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 20th day of October, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
UNITED STORE WORKERS,
Union,
-andBLOOMINQDALE BROS.,

Employer.

ISSUE
WHAT SHALL BE THE GENERAL INCREASE,
IF ANY, IN THE STRAIGHT TIME HOURLY
RATES OP PAY FOR ALL EMPLOYEES
(INCLUDING STUDENTS AND CONTINGENTS
BUT EXCLUDING STRAIGHT COMMISSION
EMPLOYEES) WHO ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES
ON THE PAYROLL AS OF MARCH 1, 1971,
EXCEPT THOSE WHOSE RATES ARE RELATED
TO OUTSIDE RATES, FOR THE PERIOD FROM
MARCH 1. 1971 TO FEBRUARY.29» 1972?

Bloomingdale Bros, operates a large, modern,
full-service department store in midtown Manhattan. For
many years, the Company's employees have been represented
by the United Store Workers and its predecessor.

And, this

relationship has produced a series of collective agreements.
that has spanned more than a quarter century.
The last stipulation in the series was entered
into on April 30, 1970.

It provided, among other things,

for two 13.333 cents an hour wage increases; the first to
be effective March 1, 1970, the second to be implemented
on May 1, 1970.

These two hourly wage adjustments represented

a weekly wage increase of $10 and were made payable to all
employees (including students and contingents, but excluding
straight commission employees) who were regular employees on
the payroll as of the date of the signing of the agreement.
Although the parties' 1970 negotiations produced an
agreement on the wage increases that were to be made effective
in 19709 there was no agreement on the amount of the increases,
if any, that would become effective between March 1, 1971 and
February 29, 1972.

The parties did, however, provide a pro-

cedure for the peaceful resolution of this problem.
of the April 30, 1970 stipulation provides:
"The Employer and the Union shall,
immediately after January 1, 1971,
or as soon thereafter as possible,
confer only with respect to a general
increase in the straight time hourly
rates of pay for all employees (including

Section 7

students and contingents but excluding
straight commission employees) who are
regular employees on the payroll as of
March 1, 1971> except those whose rates
are related to outside rates, for the
period from March 1, 1971 to February 29,
1972.
"The parties agree that the negotiations
in regard to this matter shall be resolved
as quickly as possible; and in the event
that they fail to agree by March 1, 1971,
either party shall have the right to refer
this matter to arbitration before Eric
Schmertz or his designee in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement. It
is understood that the Arbitrator shall
schedule hearings expeditiously and issue
his award on or before May 1, 1971."
The parties met pursuant to Section 7 but were
unable to agree.

Thereafter, their dispute was presented to

me for final and binding arbitration.

A hearing was held on

March 25, 1971, at which the parties were offered a full
opportunity to present all their proofs and arguments.
These different contentions touched on a number of
areas, to wit:
'1.

Whether the amount of prior settlements at

Bloomingdale's was part of a pattern established at
Qimbels

or was part of a pattern related essentially

to Macy'sj

2. The long

and short-term effect of increases

in the cost of living, viewed in the light of actual
increases in earnings by Bloomingdale's employees, and
taking into account the fact that those employees have
fully paid medical and hospital coverage;
3.

Prior wage increases related to standards as

opposed to raises limited to increases in the cost of
living;
A.

The degree to which productivity had or had

not increased since March, 1970; and
5. The effect of competition in this vigorously
competitive industry.
The various arguments related to these areas were ably and
vigorously presented and I have given them all careful consideration.
The uncontroverted evidence shows that Bloomingdale's
employees are currently earning, on average, $117 a week, i.e.,
$3.12 an hour.

Similarly situated employees working for Macy's

and in Gimbels are earning, on average, $111.75 ($2.98 an hour)
and $111.38 ($2.97 an hour) a week, respectively. Bloomingdale's
average weekly earnings thus exceed Macy's and Gimbels by over
five dollars a week.

This is a substantial differential given

the highly competitive nature of the industry.

*'

The evidence further shows that the two five
dollar a week increases given by Bloomingdale's in 1970,
when taken together, were essentially the same in amount
as the ten dollar increase that became effective at Macy's
on February 1, 1970.

That ten dollar wage increase was

subsequently converted into a $10.50 increase in average
weekly earnings at Macy's, a figure that takes into account
increases in commission income and the effect of turnover.
At Bloomingdale's, the two five dollar increases resulted
in an $11.25 increase in average weekly earnings, a differential from the Macy's figure that is significant.
Further, the evidence shows that from 1965 through
1970, average weekly earnings at Bloomingdale's increased
$22.50, while average weekly earnings at Macy's went up $16.12.*
These Increases resulted from general wage increases at
Bloomingdale's amounting to $25.62 and from general increases
at Macy's amounting to $17.00.
Given this history and the fact that Bloomingdale's
is providing the highest average weekly earnings in the

» T h e increase in average earnings at Gimbels during the
same period was $22e87s but Gimbels started from a much
lower base.

organized segment of the industry, I have concluded,
despite the Union's vigorous arguments to the contrary,
that the increase that is to be effective retroactive to
March 1, 1971 should be $6.00 a week, i.e. , l6s£ an hour.
This is the same wage increase that was made effective at
Macy's on February 1, 1971.

Given all the facts and cir-

cumstances, and particularly the fact that Bloomingdale
employees are currently earning so much more than their
fellows at other stores,* this increase appears to be
!

equitable.
In reaching this conclusion, I have been fully
aware of the effect of the increase in the cost of living
i

upon the employees involved.

The $6.00 increase, coupled

with the $10.00 granted in 1970, more than offsets the
increase
in the cost of living; indeed, provides a meaning.
ful increase in standards.

This is particularly so because

Bloomingdale employees have not been affected by any of the
steep increases in medical and hospital costs, an important
component of the consumer price index; have benefited from

1

T h i s opinion should not be construed as approving that
differential or as a precedent which impliedly looks to
its continuance. Whether or not the differential is or
is not maintained or, for that matter,is increased or
decreased, will depend on future decisions made in
collective bargaining, not arbitration.

Li
'

increases in commission income; and are able to fulfill
some, but obviously not all, their consumer needs at a
discount by purchasing in the store0

AWARD
Those employees

(including students and contingents

but excluding straight commission employees) who were
regular employees on the payroll as of March 1, 1971,
except those whose rates are related to outside rates,
shall receive as of March 1, 1971 an increase of
sixteen cents (16£) per hour.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

April 30, 1971
State of New York )Ss.:
County of New York)
On this 30th day of April 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same
Case # 1330 0205 71
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Mrs. Harold Braverman
and
Anti-Defamation
of B'Nai Brith

Award
League

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated January 1, 1970 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the parties, Awards, as follows:
The claim of the Estate of Harold Braverman for
vacation pay for the year 1970 is granted. The
Employer shall pay Mrs. Harold Braverman on behalf of the Estate, vacation pay at the appropriate
rate for 22 working days.
The claim for vacation pay for the year 1971 is
denied.

Eric ty Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December
STATE OF New York )ss. .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 2*7 day of December, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1330 0925 71

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Mrs. Harold Bravertnan
and

Opinion

Anti-Defamation League
of B'Nai Brith

In accordance with Article XI of the contract between the
Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai Brith and Professional Staff
Personnel Committee dated January 1, 1970, the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute between Mrs. Harold Braverman (on behalf of the Estate of the
late Harold Braverman), hereinafter referred to as "Braverman,"
and the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai Brith, hereinafter referred to as the "Employer."
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on November 17, 1971 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross examine witnesses.
The issue as stipulated is:
Did the Employer violate the contract with regard
to vacation pay for Braverman for the years 1970
and 1971? If so, what shall be the remedy?
The main thrust of the Employer's case is that because it
granted the late Harold Braverman an extended period of sick
leave with pay from the time he suffered a stroke, throughout
the many months of his disabling illness and until his death a period of time far in excess of the contractual sick leave

- 2 benefit - his Estate has no justifiable claim for vacation pay
for the years 1970 and 1971.
Though I recognize the Employer's equitable argument, it
is neither supported by the facts nor the contract, and it is to
these to which this Arbitrator is bound.
I find that at no time, when Mr. Braverman was placed on
sick leave by the Employer on July 12, 1970, when his sick leave
was extended in January 1971, or throughout the period of that
sick leave until February 27, 1971 when he died, did the Employer condition the granting of that extended sick leave with pay
on a waiver, relinquishment or use of any vacation entitlement.
The contract provisions for sick leave and vacation are separate.

One is neither conditioned upon nor subsumed by the

other.

Therefore absent some clear understanding to the contrary,

I cannot find that the granting of sick leave or even its gratuitous extension beyond the contract time limit automatically
works to vitiate an accrued vacation benefit.

The evidence in

this case does not disclose any such contrary understanding.
When Mr. Braverman suffered his stroke the day before he was to
officially begin his vacation, the Employer placed him on a six
month sick leave with pay beginning with the "onset of his illness.'1

Therefore, instead of either commencing or using any of

his vacation for the year 1970, his status was changed, by the
action of the Employer, to that of "sick leave."
There was no agreement with Mr. Braverman or his wife, either expressed or implied at that time, that any portion of the
sick leave would consume the 1970 vacation.

The same was true

* in January of 1971 when the Employer agreed to extend Mr. Brav-

- 3 erman's sick leave after he had suffered a heart attack.

And

though I consider it probable that the Employer was willing to
go well beyond the contractual sick leave entitlement in order
to put Mr. Braverman in the most favorable position for pension
purposes in the event he was permanently disabled, together
with commendable humanitarian reasons prompted by Mr. Braverman's many years of service, none of this constituted an agreement between the Employer and the Bravermans to use or extinguish, or subsume within the sick leave, Mr. Braverman's vacation rights.
The Employer also contends that its check dated April 19,
1971 in the amount of $13,142.75 to the order of Mrs. Braverman
constituted full payment and settlement of all claims of the
Estate against the Employer including all claims for vacation

pay.
I cannot agree.
ment whatsoever.

The check contains no explanatory state-

The Employer relies on its covering letter of

the same date to Mrs. Braverman in which it stated that "the
enclosed check represents payment in full of all sums due."
However, that statement refers to the immediate preceding paragraph in the letter which delineates specifically the purpose
of the check, namely for moneys due for the period February 22
through February 26, 1971 - i.e. salary while still on sick
leave - and the balance, severance pay upon death, pursuant to
Article VI Paragraph D of the contract.

So, as specifically ex-

pressed by the Employer in its letter, the check covered salary
and severance pay, and was in full payment of those amounts. It

- 4did not purport to cover any vacation claim.

Moreover, in time-

ly manner thereafter counsel for Mrs. Braverman, in a letter
dated April 23, 1971 to the Employer, expressly stated that
vacation money was still owed the Estate for the years 1970 and
1971.

Accordingly I do not see how the negotiation of that

check by Mrs. Braverman can be construed either as an abandonment of or as prejudicial to her claim in this proceeding for
her husband's vacation entitlement.
Nor do I find that Braverman's vacation rights were either
granted or prejudiced by the fact that he drew vacation pay the
last day worked on July 10, 1970 before commencing his planned
vacation three days later.

Obviously that money was retained

by him as salary during the first month of his sick leave after
being placed in that status as of July 12, 1970.

It is undis-

puted that during that first period of his illness he did not
receive a salary check though he was on sick leave with paya
Clearly, as a bookkeeping matter, the vacation money which he
drew was deemed by the Employer and recorded as salary for that
period of time.
ed.

Thereafter his regular salary payments resum-

Consequently I fail to see how his retention of the vaca-

tion money, in lieu of salary payment by the Employer during a
comparable period when he was on sick leave with pay, can be
interpreted as receipt of vacation pay for the year 1970.
For the foregoing reasons I find neither a waiver, relinquishment or use during his sick leave period from July 12, 1970
until his death on February 27, 1971, of any vacation benefit
to which Braverman was entitled.

- 5Remaining is the question of the amount of vacation entitlement.

It is clear that for the vacation year 1970 his Estate

is entitled to the full amount of vacation pay under Article
VIII Section B of the contract - or in other words 22 working
days (based on Mr. Braverman's more than 10 years of service).
He had earned and accrued a full vacation because of his active
employment during the full vacation year prior to July 1, 19700
(It is stipulated that the measuring service period for vacation benefits is July 1 through June 30. )
But had he earned vacation for the year 1971?

In other

words was he entitled to pro rata accrued vacation for the period July 1, 1970 until his death on February 27, 1971?
clude not.

I con-

Section C of Article VII expressly provides for the

payment of pro rata vacation, where the full prior year of service from July 1 through June 30 has not been completed, only
"in the event of dismissal or resignation of a staff member."
It does not provide for payment of a pro rata vacation in the
event of death.

Clearly, the possibility of death during a 12

month period prior to a full vacation entitlement was foreseeable by the parties when that Section C was negotiated.

And

if payment of a pro rata vacation in the event of death was intended, Section C could easily have said so.

That it did not

leads to only one logical conclusion - that the parties intended to limit vacation pay on a pro rata basis only to dismissals
or resignations.

Accordingly Braverman's claim for a pro rata

vacation for the year 1971 must be denied.
Apparently the provisions for severance pay under Article
VI, which by the express terms of that Article, is not avail-

- 6 able to employees who quit or retire or are discharged under
specified circumstances, is_ however extended to any employee
who dies, and therefore represents a substitute for pro rata
vacation pay.
It should be clear however, that the foregoing interpretation of the relationship between vacation pay and severance pay
applies, so far as the instant case is concerned, only to Braverman's claim to pro rata vacation for the year 1971.
In short it is clear to me that the severance pay clause,
interpreted together with Section C of the vacation clause, represents a substitute only for pro rata vacation in the event of
death.

Manifestly it does not constitute a substitute for vaca-

tion pay fully earned as a result of full service during the 12
month period July 1 through June 30 immediately preceding the
vacation in question.

Hence the Employer's payment of severance

pay to Mrs. Braverman disposed of the claim for pro rata vacation for the year 1971, but in no way affected her claim for
Braverman's full vacation entitlement for the year 1970.
Accordingly the Employer is directed to pay Mrs. Braverman
on behalf of the Estate of the late Harold Braverman, 22 days
vacation pay at the appropriate rate for the year 1970.

£A*l4^LU*»+4*/\z /
Arbitrator

7H
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Anita Zakin
and

t
'
'
i
'
'

Award

Board of Higher Education of the
City of New York

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated September 15, 1969 and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
Within the meaning of the Nota Bene there was an
arbitrary use of procedure in connection with the
denial of the reappointment of Anita Zakin. A
hearing on the matter of remedy shall be scheduled,,

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December
1971
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York) ' * "
On this
day of December, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1339 0732 70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'

Anita Zakin

'
and

Board of Higher Education of the
City of New York

'

Opinion

t

'
'

In accordance with Article VI of the Agreement between
The Legislative Conference of the City University of New
York and the Board of Higher Education of the City of New
York, the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the grievance of Miss Anita Zakin.
Hearings were held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on December 10, 1970, May 10, June 1,
June 16, June 25, August 4 and August 18, 1971.

The arbitra-

tion is between Miss Zakin individually, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant,'1 and the Board of Higher Education of
the City of New York, hereinafter referred to as the "Board."
The grievant, her attorney, and representatives of the Board
appeared at all hearings and were afforded full opportunity
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
briefs.

The grievant and the Board filed post hearing

The stenographic record of the hearings consists of

820 pages.

Over 60 exhibits were introduced into evidence0

The grievant was an Instructor of Music at Kingsborough
Community College, serving in that capacity during the academic years 1967-1968 and 1968-1969.

On November 3, 1969 the

Department (Division) Personnel and Budget Committee (P&B
Committee) voted not to reappoint her for the academic year

- 2 1970-1971 (under the existing By-law provisions, had the grievant been reappointed for that year she would have received
tenure.)

The grievant requested a re-hearing, and on Decem-

ber 15, 1969 that Committee re-affirmed its denial of her
reappointment.

The grievant then appealed to the College P&B

Committee, which voted to deny her appeal on January 20, 1971.
On March 16, 1970 she filed a Step 1 grievance under the
grievance provisions of the Agreement, which the President of
the College denied on March 28, 1970.

On April 22, 1970 she

filed a Step 2 grievance which the University Vice-chancellor
denied on March 13, 1970.

She then submitted her grievance

to arbitration.
Based on the record I determine that the grievant and
the Board agreed to the following issue and procedure regarding remedy, if any:
Whether within the meaning of the Nota Bene there
was an arbitrary or discriminatory use of procedure in connection with the grievant's denial of
reappointment„
If that question is determined in the grievant's
favor the matter of remedy is to be the subject
of a further hearing(s).
The grievant charges violation of Article XVII, Sections
17.1, 17.3, 17.4, 17.5; Article XVIII, Sections 18.1 and 18.2
of the Agreement and Section 9.3 of the Board's By-laws referred to in Article 1 and Article VI Section 6.2 of the
Agreement, as constituting arbitrary or discriminatory uses
of procedure within the meaning of the Nota Bene.

Addition-

ally the grievant charges that the then Chairman of her
Department was biased and prejudiced against her and that

- 3 his influence played a significant part in the denial of her
reappointment.
The Board defends on several grounds.

It denies the

facts as alleged by the grievant; asserts that if there were
procedural mistakes they were inconsequential and not of an
arbitrary or discriminatory magnitude; that any procedural
errors were cured at the higher levels of the grievant's
appeal; and that her denial of reappointment and tenure was
based on "academic judgment" within the meaning of the first
sentence of the Nota Bene and therefore not subject to review
in arbitration.
My original drafts of this Opinion set forth in considerable detail the specific alleged contract and By-law violations claimed by the grievant.

I have decided however that

in its final form this Opinion need not recite all those details, for two reasons.

First, the stenographic record and

the grievant's brief contain the full specifics of each charge.
Second, and most important, it is my conclusion that if I find
any one or some of the charges as an arbitrary or discriminatory use of procedure within the meaning of the Nota Bene,
this case, at that point, is transformed fully to its remedial
stage.

As I see it, it makes no difference whether there was

a single or multiple arbitrary or discriminatory use of procedure with regard to the denial of the grievant's reappointment, for in either event the scope of my authority to iashion
a remedy if any, is equally as complete and is neither enlarged nor narrowed by how many times the Nota Bene was violated.

- 4Accordingly I choose to address this Opinion to certain
charges where I find an arbitrary or discriminatory use of
procedure.

With that finding, it becomes unnecessary, be-

cause it would be potentially superfluous and cumulative, for
me to determine one way or the other whether the balance of
the charges reached the arbitrary or discriminatory level as
alleged by the grievant.
The pertinent part of the Nota Bene reads:
Grievances relating to appointment, reappointment,
tenure or promotion which are concerned with matters
of academic judgment may not be processed by the
Conference beyond Step 2 of the grievance procedure.
Grievances within the scope of these areas in which
there is an allegation of arbitrary or discriminatory
use of procedure may be processed by the Conference
through Step 3 of the grievance procedure.
I find an arbitrary use of procedure with regard to the
denial of the grievant's reappointment with tenure because of
the Board's failure to follow certain pertinent prescribed
provisions of Articles XVII and XVIII of the Agreement; and
I find the errors specified below not to be matters of academic judgment within the meaning of the Nota Bene.

The pertin-

ent sections of Articles XVII and XVIII read;
17.1 All evaluations of the professional activities
of the employees shall be in writing. An evaluation
conference of professional activities shall be based
on total academic performance, including such elements
as:
(a) Classroom instruction and related activities
(b) Administrative assignments
(c) Research
(d) Scholarly writing
(e) Departmental, college and university committee
assignments
(f) Student counseling

- 5 lT/,2 At least once each semester non-tenured employees shall, and tenured employees may, be evaluated on the basis of at least a one hour observation of the work of the employee. The employee
shall be given at least twenty-four (24) hours of
prior notice of observation.
17 . 3 The department chairman within a period of
three (3) weeks from the date of observation shall
discuss the evaluation with the employee who shall
have the right to present any material he feels
is pertinent to the proper consideration of the
nature and scope of the evaluation. Immediately
following discussion of the evaluation with the
employee, the chairman shall prepare a record of
the discussion in memorandum form.
17. 4 Such memorandum shall become a part of the
employee's personnel file in accordance with the
conditions for making it a part of such file as
set forth under provisions made for Personnel
Files (Article XVIII),
17.5. At least once each year, each employee
shall have an evaluation conference with his department chairman. At such conference, the employee's total academic and professional progress
for that year and cumulatively to-date shall be
reviewed. Immediately following this discussion,
the chairman shall prepare a record of the discussion in memorandum form,,
17 .6. Such memorandum shall become a part of the
employee's personal file in accordance with the
conditions for making it a part of such file as
set forth under provisions made for Personnel
Files (Article XVIII),

No materials shall be placed in the employee 's personal file until the employee has been
given the opportunity to read the contents and
attach any comments he may so desire. Each such
document shall be initialed by the employee before
being placed in his file as evidence of his having
read such document. This initialing shall not be
deemed to constitute approval by the employee of
the contents of such document. If the employee
refuses to initial any document after having been
given an opportunity to read the same, a statement
to that effect shall be affixed to the document.

- 6 18.3 There shall be a separate administration
file which shall contain:
(a) All materials requested by the unit of
the City University or supplied by the employee in connection with the employee's
original employment.
(b) All observation reports of the employee's
academic and professional performance.
The administration file shall be available only to
the committees and individuals responsible for the
review and recommendation of the employee with respect to appointment, reappointment, promotion or
tenure,,
A major contention of the grievant is that her files,
when presented to the committees and individuals for evaluation in connection with her reappointment did not contain certain materials which should have been included.
During the grievant's first two years the only "formal"
observation were those of Drs. Mauzey and Jacobs in the first
year and Jacobs in the second year, all of which were favorable
to the grievant.

Clearly, observation reports of this type are

an important part of a teacher's file and material to an evaluation of an employee's performance for purposes of reappointment and/or tenure.

There is no dispute that reports of this

type should be made available to the committee(s) evaluating a
teacher for retention, reappointment and tenure.
Yet the weight of the evidence is that these observation
reports were not in the grievant's file when the Division P&B
Committee reviewed those files and made its initial determination to deny her reappointment on November 3, 1969.
The grievant who was given an opportunity to review her
files on March 26, 1970, asserts she never saw the Mauzey report and that she saw the Jacobs observation only after the
* adverse decision of the Vice-chancellor in May, 1970.

- 7 Professor Katherine Barry testified that as a member of
the Legislative Conference she accompanied the grievant in
March 1970 to review the files in connection with this grievance.

She stated that she examined the files and although

she was not sure of the exact date, Dr. Mauzey's observation
was not there„
Professor Irene Kiernan testified that as a member of
the College P&B Committee which heard the grievant's appeal
on January 13, 1970, she reviewed the files and did not find
there either the Jacobs or Mauzey observations.

She further

testified that she learned that Mauzey's observation was missing some time in December, 1970 and that somewhat earlier the
Jacobs observation was missing,,
Dr. Wolkenfeld, the then Department Chairman, did not rebut this testimony.

He could not testify with assurance that

the Mauzey and Jacobs observations were in the files when the
Division P&B Committee considered the grievant's reappointment.
All that Dr. Wolkenfeld could say was "that what was before
the Committee were all the files that were, as far as I know
available at the School on Miss Zakin."

He testified that as

Chairman it was his duty to prepare the files for the Committee.
The Fall of 1969 when the grievant's appointment was up for review, was the first year of the Agreement with the Legislative
Conference.

The time was, as conceded by Dr. Wolkenfeld,

"quite hectic with a lot to do" and "the contract had gone into effect in September of 1969 ... nobody knew very much about
how to implement the contract actually."

He testified that

in preparing the grievant's files he followed the applicable

- 8 procedure but that because her file was so voluminous he was
unable to tell if anything was missing and "it is quite possible
that a specific piece of paper was not available."
Accordingly I conclude, based on the evidence on this
point, that two important evaluations, favorable to the grievant, were not in her file when the Division P&B
sidered her for reappointment.

Committee con-

Manifestly this error is pro-

cedural and not an exercise of "academic judgment."

And the

failure of the College to see to it that two such consequential
reports were among the papers considered in the evaluation is,
in my view a procedural breach of arbitrary proportions,

even

if unintential.
In addition I find an arbitrary breach of Section 18.2
of the Agreement.

In the third year the grievant was observed

by Dr. Sherker, Professor Slatin and observed and evaluated by
Dr. Wolkenfeld.

There was much testimony concerning the pro-

priety and usefulness of the Sherker observation since it was
made on the final day of the World Series involving the New
York Mets.

But Professor Slatin testified that her observa-

tion was favorable to the grievant.
Dr. Wolkenfeld's observation of the grievant was on October 26, 1969 following which he had a conference with her. By
letter dated October 27, 1969 she stated her position regarding
his expressed criticism at that meeting of her teaching.
On November 20, 1969 after the Division P&B Committee met
Dr. Wolkenfeld had another conference with the grievant.

In

the course of that Conference he advised her of the P&B Committee' s decision and of the options available to her.

He

- 9then prepared a "Memorandum of Observation and Evaluation"
which was to be a summary of that meeting.
Under the provisions of Section 18.2 of the Agreement,
the Chairman's memorandum of that conference was not to be
placed in the grievant's personal file until she had been given the opportunity to read the contents and attach comments.
Wolkenfeld did not give the grievant a copy of his memorandum
but rather merely notified her that it was available for her
to see and sign.

In my view, in order that the provisions

of Section 18.2 be complied with, a Department Chairman should
make every reasonable effort to place his memorandum before
the employee involved or at least forward it to him so that it
can be read and initialed, and the employee's comments can be
attached.

Mere notification by the Chairman, as in this case,

that the memorandum is available in the Chairman's office for
the employee to see, does not, in my view meet the Chairman's
responsibility under Section 18.2 and does not afford the
employee the safeguards specified therein, especially when, as
here the memorandum purported to summarize a meeting in which
the grievant was told of her unfavorable evaluation,,
The grievant testified that she first saw the memorandum
when she reviewed her files on March 26, 1970; and it "had
very little in common with my conference with Chairman Wolkenfeld."

She further testified that the College President had

made a determination of her Step 1 grievance before she had an
opportunity to see the evaluation and reply to it.
With respect to Dr. Wolkenfeld's summary memorandum,

- 10 Professor Slatin, one of the three whose observation was coved in the evaluation conference, testified that the memorandum
did not reflect her observation report.

As to almost every

critical statement in the memorandum, Dr. Slatin testified
that it was incorrect as far as her observation was concerned.
She categorically stated that the summary statement "nevertheless my judgment is that your teaching in the observed classes
was not effective" was not her judgment and "I do not feel
that at all."
On December 16, 1969 Dr. Wolkenfeld prepared a memo to
the files in which he stated that the grievant should have
been presented with a copy of his summary memorandum before
the committee "reached a decision on her reappointment."

Thus

Wolkenfeld admits this error„
His memo to the files stated however that the committee
still got a pretty full view of her objections since she had
sent a memo dated October 27, 1969 (referred to as October 22
in Mr. Wolkenfeld's memo to the files) subsequent to Wolkenfeld1 s observation.

In the face of the explicit provisions of

Section 18.2, I cannot accept Dr. Wolkenfeld's statement that
the committee was therefore already familiar with the grievant1s
objections.

It had before it Dr. Wolkenfeld1s written summary

of his evaluation meeting with the grievant.

There is Professor

Slatin1s testimony that that written summary did not coincide
with her observation report.

The committee did not have be-

fore it the grievant's written comments or objections to either the evaluation or the summary memorandum.

The grievant's

objections which she should have been given an opportunity to

- 11 attach in writing, had the summary been sent to her or placed
before her to be read and signed, were not before the committee
on the same formal and official basis as was Dr. Wolkenfeld's
memorandum and evaluation.

So I fail to see how any informal

knowledge that the committee or its members may have had about
the grievant's objections could carry the same weight as if
those objections had been filed with the Committee as Section
18.2 intended.
So again, I find a procedural error which does not involve
"academic judgment" and which, no matter what the cause, was of
sufficient potential prejudice to a full and fair evaluation of
the grievant's record to be arbitrary„

I reach the same con-

clusion and for the same reasons with regard to a procedural
error concerning the "self evaluation" form in the grievant's
third yeare
Each year teachers fill out a self evaluation form which
lists "services beyond the line of duty."

The purpose of the

form is to provide information about the teacher that only the
teacher is aware of and which may not be known to others.

In

addition, it affords the teacher an opportunity for a type of
"selective self-selling."
In her first two years the grievant completed such forms.
She testified that she had "always received it prior to any
conference."

She claims that in the third year she did not re-

ceive the form prior to her conference with Dr. Wolkenfeld on
November 20, 1969, and that therefore at that conference he did
not have before him the evaluation sheet listing her services

- 12 other than teaching for that academic year.

She testified

that at that conference she asked Dr. Wolkenfeld to give her
the form but that she did not get one until later.

She testi-

fied that she received the form on November 25, 1969 and submitted a completed one on November 28, 1969.

In a covering

letter she complained about not having received the form prior
to the conference of November 20 and that Dr. Wolkenfeld's
summary had dismissed her non-teaching service to the school as
"none."

She testified that at least five non-teaching services

which she listed on the form were performed between the commencement of the school year in September, 1969 and November 3, the
date the Division P&B Committee passed on her reappointment.
In short she complained, quite properly, that the Division P&B
Committee did not have before it her completed "Instructional
Staff Information Sheet" listing her non-teaching service to
the College, but instead had Dr. Wolkenfeld's summary statement
that those services were "none."
I am of the view that such information, especially where
it tends to contradict the Chairman's evaluation, should have
been before the Division P&B Committee.

Clearly if the self

evaluation form asks for pertinent information regarding nonteaching service to the College, that information is of consequence and as Dr. Wolkenfeld stated in his memo of November
17, 1969 to the staff, this information "is really important."
Obviously then, it is of importance to any Division P&B Committee evaluating a candidate for reappointment and tenure.

I con-

clude that the College should have placed the self evaluation
-

form in the grievant's hands well enough in advance of the

- 13 Division P&B Committee meeting in order to afford her the opportunity to place before that committee that important information.
And I put this burden on the College because only the Department
Chairman and the members of the P&B Committee knew when that
Committee would actually meet to consider the grievant's reappointment „
I reject the assertion that the error was non-prejudicial.
I do not agree that it was "cured" by the fact that the material
was thereafter made available to the P&B Committee at its rehearing on December 15, 1969 and available at the subsequent
appeal levels.
The purposes and intent of Articles XVII and XVIII as I
read them, is that the pertinent material be available in a candidate 's file and before the appropriate committees at each step
of the evaluation and reappointment procedure; not simply available at the time of a re-hearing or an appeal to the next level.
The "record below" i.e. the first determination of the Division
P&B Committee establishes a presumption, favorable or adverse
to a candidate, in all subsequent hearings or steps.

If an ad-

verse presumption is based on all pertinent material and information required by the Agreement, a candidate cannot complain
if the burden is on him to overcome itp in a re-hearing or on
appeal.

But if, as here, an adverse presumption may well have

been created because pertinent information favorable to the
grievant's case was either missing from her files or not before
the Committee because the Department had not sought it from her
in time, then it is unfair to place upon her the burden to over-

- 14 come it0

If material errors can be cured at the point of

appeal, there would be no need for a several stage evaluation
process.

Instead one determination, at the highest level

would suffice.

But under the evaluation procedure involved

here, I think it realistic to assume a presumption towards
affirmation by the higher levels, of the initial P&B determination.

And where that initial determination was made in the

absence of significant and relevant material favorable to the
grievant, I cannot agree that that error is cured merely because
the missing information became subsequently available either at
a re-hearing or on appeal.
1 also find an arbitrary use of procedure in connection
with the re-hearing before the Division P&B Committee in December, 1969.

The grievant appeared and attempted to rebut criti-

cism that she had led classes in which there was "no teaching
and no learning."

In her defense she made reference to stud-

ents' notes that were made during the observed classes and
read from some of them.

The Committee asked her to produce

the notes and she stated that she would submit copies to the
Committee and would include other notes as well.
to submit them soon but no precise time was fixed.

She agreed
Yet the

Committee reached its determination that very night, before
the grievant had an opportunity to produce the notes, which
she was led to believe the Committee wished to have before it
acted.

When Dr. Wolkenfeld was asked in the course of the

hearings why a determination was made before the grievant was
given a chance to submit the students' notes, he was directed

- 15 by counsel not to answer and did not (the contention was that
that information encroached on the confidentiality of the
Committee's deliberations), but conceded that the decision was
made that very evening„
Regardless of the weight that the Committee might ultimately have given to the students' notes, the fact is that the griev
ant requested and received permission to submit that material
in support of her appeal, and there is no doubt that she was
led to believe that no decision would be made by the Committee
until she submitted those notes or until a reasonable time
for her to do so had elapsed.

Such action was clearly contrary

to a fair and objective determination of the merits of the
grievant's case on re-hearing; and

in my judgment inconsist-

ent with procedural "due process" implicit in Articles VI, XVI,
XVII and XVIII of the Agreement.

And in that context I find

the action of the Division P&B Committee on re-hearing to be
an arbitrary use of procedure within the meaning of the Nota
Bene.
As previously indicated the foregoing findings are enough
to transform this case fully into its remedial stage.

Whether

or not there were additional breaches of the Nota Bene by the
Board is immaterial because my power to fashion a remedy and
the scope of that remedy would be no different.

Accordingly

a hearing on the question of remedy for the grievant will be
scheduled promptly.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I
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In accordance with Article XXVIII of the contract dated
July 1, 1970 between Herricks Teachers' Association, hereinafter referred

to as the "Association" and Board of Education

Union Free School District #9, hereinafter referred to as the
"District," the Undersigned was selected as the sole Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Did the District violate the contract when it scheduled the guidance counsellors for 10-1/2 months
effective July 1, 1971? If so what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the District on
June 7, 1971 at which time representatives of the Association
and the District, hereinafter referred to jointly as'the
parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument.

The parties waived both the Arbitrator's

oath and the contract provision calling for a tripartite Board
of Arbitration.
I am satisfied that this dispute is properly determinable
within the confines of the contract without resort to the Education Law or court decisions.
The District's action and the grievance which arose therefrom occurred during the effective period of the contract dated July 1, 1970; hence it is to the provisions of that contract

- 2 to which we must look for applicability, conformity orv iolations
The District argues that Article XXII (Salary) Section A
Paragraph 2 which reads:
Except where the annexed schedules specifically
note otherwise, all schedules are based upon ten
(10) month school year from September through
June in accordance with the agreed calendar annexed to this agreement, and those who are employed
on an eleven (11) months contract shall be compensated on the basis of ten percent (10%) of the
annual schedule payment for such monthf
does not constitute a guarantee of 11 months work for guidance
counsellors.

Rather the District asserts it merely fixes the

compensation of those employees scheduled to work 10 months or
employed to work 11; but that it is within the District's managerial discretion to determine whether more than 10 months
will be scheduled.

Or in short, the District is not required to

schedule a guidance counsellor beyond 10 months; only if it does
must it compensate him in accordance with the foregoing contract
provision.
I find I need not determine whether the District's interpretation of Article XXII is correct, or whether, contrarywise
as the Association contends that Article represents a contractual confirmation of a guaranteed 11 month work year for guidance counsellors (the only employees covered by the contract
who have previously worked 11 months) because even if I accepted
the District's interpretation, its case in this arbitration fails,
In advancing its interpretation, the District asserts that
the contract neither covers nor limits the District's right to
determine the work year of the guidance counsellors.

It is the

District's position that that question was never negotiated; is

- 3 not encompassed within the contract, and consequently remains a
managerial prerogative.

However there can be no real dispute

with the conclusion that the length of a work year is a "condition of employment" in the traditional and well established
collective bargaining sense.

Also it is undisputed that without

exception, for at least the last five years and perhaps for as
long as since 1954, the District has employed guidance counsellors
for 11 months each year.

It follows, and therefore I conclude,

based, in part at least on the District's own argumen^ that the
11 month work year of guidance counsellors meets the test of a
"condition of employment prior to this Agreement and not covered
by this Agreement ..." within the meaning of Article XXIX of the
contract.
Article XXIX (Maintenance of Standards) reads:
Established policy as to rates, hours, benefits,
and conditions of employment prior to this Agreement and not covered by this Agreement shall not
be reduced or withdrawn during the term of this
Agreement.
Its mandate and proscription are clear.

Applied to the

instant dispute it means, even under the District's theory, that
.
for the term of this contract the 11 month work year of guidance
counsellors may not be reduced.
As previously indicated, Article XXIX is applicable because
it was in full force and effect at the time that the District
took its action and when the grievance resulting therefrom arose.
At that time, Article XXIX, by its own language, was enforceable
"during the term of this Agreement."

That the parties under the

re-opening provisions of Article XXXII subsequently negotiated a
'change in the language of Article XXIX effective July 1, 1971

- 4does not change the applicability of the prior language to the
instant case.

As I see it the new language, effective July 1,

1971 is prospective, i.e. covering only disputes which may
arise on and after July 1, 1971.

But prior thereto, when the

instant grievance arose, the foregoing language of Article XXIX
remains fully controlling.
Also undisputed is that during the negotiations under the
re-opening clause which resulted in a change in the language
of Article XXIX, the District did not indicate any plan to reduce the work year of the guidance counsellors from 11 to 10-1/2
months effective July 1, 1971.

Therefore, absent any such no-

tice to the Association, I find neither an equitable nor contractual basis upon which the new language of Article XXIX
effective July 1, 1971, can be made retroactive to the action
which the District chose to take prior to the effective date
of the newly negotiated clause, despite the fact that the new
work schedule of the guidance counsellors was not to begin
until July 1, 1971.
I make no judgment on what the result would have been had
the District waited until July 1, 1971 (if that was practicable)
to announce a reduction in the work year of guidance

counsellors

In that event the meaning and interpretation of the newly negotiated language of Article XXIX might have been at issue. Whether or not the result would be the same is not before me.
This is not to say that the District did not have sound
economic reasons to reduce the work year of the guidance councilors together with the other educational and administrative
cut-backs it undertook.

I am persuaded that the District is

- 5 confronted with a tight economic condition and that savings
where possible are warranted and needed.

But a saving or cut-

back which turns out to be violative of a bilaterally negotiated contract cannot be sustained unless agreed to by the parties to that contract, despite its economic merit.
Also this is not to say that the District is obligated to
guarantee full employment to all its employees.

Clearly it

has the right to effectuate whatever layoffs are necessary.
Article XXIX deals with "conditions of employment," which requires employment as a condition precedent to its applicability
And therefore it has no bearing on the number of employees the
District chooses to or must lay off or not rehire.

But so far

as the guidance counsellors are concerned, though the District
retains the unrestricted right to determine the number of guidance counsellors it will employ, those it does retain must be
employed for 11 months as a "prior condition of employment not
covered by the (contract) which may not be reduced during the
(contract)"
Accordingly the Undersigned Arbitrator having been duly
designated in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement dated
July 1, 1970, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the parties makes the following Award;
The District violated the Agreement when it scheduled guidance counsellors for 10-1/2 months effective July 1, 1971. The District shall schedule the
guidance counsellors for 11 months work commencing
and effective July 1, 1971.

Eric /). Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: June 10, 1971
STATE OF New York )ss.•
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 10th day of June, 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584 International Brotherhood of Teamsters
and

FINDINGS
AND
AWARD

Branglebrink Dairy

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated November 11, 1969 between Branglebrink Dairy, hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer," and Local 584 IBT, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Has the Employer violated the Milk Industry
Collective Bargaining Agreement in connection
with the sale of a route? If so what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on November 23, 1970 at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross
examine witnesses.
The pertinent contract sections are Sections 8(a) and (b)
which read;
(a) Before any change in the production or distribution methods or operations of the Employer
which may affect employees covered by this contract is effectuated by the Employer, the Employer shall first notify the Union in writing by
certified mail at least ten (10) days prior to
the proposed change and explain the reasons that
prompted the proposed change and its probable
effects.

- 2 (b) The Employer shall not sell any of its retail
or wholesale routes to any of its employees and
shall not lease its retail or wholesale routes
to any person. In the case of persons other
than employees, the Employer shall not, during
the term of this Agreement, sell any of its retail or wholesale routes except to a purchaser
who will execute this Agreement and who . will employ routemen subject to the terms and conditions
of this Agreement. In the event of the Purchaser
fails to execute such an Agreement, the Employer
shall be fully responsible for damages to the
Union, provided, however, that if the purchaser
executes this Agreement the Employer shall have
no further obligation or liability under this
Agreement except for matters occurring prior to
the execution of the Agreement by the Purchaser.
Routes which were heretofore leased or sold,
shall, upon release to the Employer or resale to
the Employer or any other person, be classified
as Company Routes and shall be subject to the
terms of this Agreement.
and the following paragraph, part of Section 16(a)
To the extent permissible under law, arbitration shall
be the exclusive remedy for claim for money damages by
the parties against each other arising under Sections
301 or 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act or
equivalent provisions of state law, and for all claims
for money damages for breach of this Agreement.
I find that the Employer violated Sections 8(a) and (b)
of the contract when, without notice to the Union it transferred
one "leg" of a route to Oaktree Dairy, a company which was not
a signatory to the Collective Bargaining Agreement and has not
become a signatory thereto.

And the Employer violated Section

8(a) of the contract when it transferred the other "leg" of the
route, without notice to the Union, to Sagtikos Dairy, who is a
signatory to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
I find that both transfers were "sales" of the route within the meaning of Section 8 of the contract, because the Employer received, as consideration, the outstanding accounts receiv-ables.

There is no dispute that such a sale or transfer con-

- 3 stitutes a change in "distribution methods or operations of
the Employer which may affect employees covered by this contract" within the meaning of Section 8(a).
In accordance with my authority to fashion a remedy as
set forth in the stipulated issue, and pursuant to the foregoing paragraph of Section 16 (a) of the contract, I direct
the following which shall constitute my AWARD:
1. The employee(s) who serviced either or both
legs of the route(s) involved prior to transfer to Oaktree and Sagtikos Dairies, shall be
paid commissions on the accounts receivables
outstanding at the time of the transfers pursuant to Schedule "A" of the contract.
2. The Employer is directed to take all steps
possible to re-acquire the leg of the route
transferred to Oaktree Dairy. If unable to do
so within 20 calendar days from the date of
this AWARD, the Employer shall pay to the Union
the sum of One Thousand Seven Hundred Ten Dollars
and seventy-six cents ($1710.76) as damages.

Er i c J ./ S chme r t z
Arbitrator

DATED: January 11, 1971
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this llth day of January, 1971, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1330 0795 70

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Legislative Conference of the
City University of New York
Award
and

The City University of New York

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated September 15, 1969 and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
In the denial of reappointment of Professor Alexander
Obolensky for the 1970-71 academic year there was not
an arbitrary or discriminatory use of procedures. The
grievance is denied.

Eric fi' Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March 29, 1971
STATE OF New York )gs .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 29th day of March 1971, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1339 0818 70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i
The Legislative Conference of the '
City University of New York
'
i

Opinion

'
t

and

The City University of New York

'
i

The stipulated issue is:
Whether in the denial of reappointment of Alexander Obolensky for the 1970-71 academic year
there was an arbitrary or discriminatory use of
procedure? If so, what shall be the remedy within the provisions of the Nota Bene?
A hearing was held on November 13, 1970 at which time
Professor Obolensky, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant,"
and representatives of the Legislative Conference, hereinafter
referred to as the "Conference," and the City University, hereinafter referred to as the "University," appeared, and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Conference and the

University filed post hearing briefs.
Under the Nota Bene the Arbitrator's authority in this
proceeding is limited.

It is not to judge the substantive

correctness or merits of the University's decision not to reappoint the grievant for the 1970-71 academic year.

Nor is

it to determine simply whether there were procedural defects
in reaching that decision.

Rather the Arbitrator has the

narrow authority to decide whether, if there were procedural
defects, such defects were arbitrary or discriminatory.
In the instant case, though I find some imperfections in

- 2 carrying out the procedures leading to the University"s decision not to reappoint the grievant, I do not find that those
defects reached an arbitrary or discriminatory level.
There is no dispute that the various and proper committees
authorized to pass on the grievant's reappointment (and tenure)
met at the proper times; and there is no evidence that their
internal procedures were improperly carried out.
Though argued at length in the Conference brief, the
allegation that the grievant was inadequately observed, counselled and informed of his status and teaching abilities prior
to consideration for reappointment for the 1970-71 academic yea,r,
was only touched on lightly in testimony at the hearing.

As

such there is not sufficient evidence in the record to find
this pre-reappointment procedure to have been inadequate, let
alone arbitrary or discriminatory.
The reference to the grievant's book on Gogol as "work in
progress" was inaccurate, in that it had been completed, accepted for publication, and in the hands of the publisher.

But I

do not consider this characterization, which was before the
Appointments Committee, as arbitrary or discriminatory or even
fatal.

It could not be said that the book was a published

work, because it had not been published at the time the grievant 's evaluation for reappointment took place.

Indeed it had

not been published at the time of this arbitration hearing.
So, though it should not have been characterized simply as
"work in progress" it would have been equally inaccurate to refer to it as "work published."

- 3 More significant is the fact that the grievant was urged, and
had the opportunity to show his book to the members of the
committee which would evaluate him for reappointment, and declined to do so.

The unrefuted evidence is that his Chairman

urged him to circulate the completed draft of his book among
the committee members well prior to the time the committee was
to meet to consider the reappointment, but that the grievant
did not do so because "the committee members would not understand it."

Consequently any possible prejudice resulting from

the imprecise reference to the status of the book, could have
been dissipated by the grievant himself had he acquainted the
committee members with what he had written in completed form,
I am not persuaded that the "ranking" of the untenured
members of the Russian section of the department was binding
on the committee which passed on the grievant's reappointment
or even material to its deliberations.

It is true that the

grievant had been ranked by the Committee on Appointments as
first in the Russian section.

But that ranking was specific-

ally for the purpose indicated - namely to establish a preference
among the untenured faculty, for retention on an untenured basis,
among those similarly
personnel.

situated

in the event of a cut-back in

If it represented a guarantee at all it was that on

an untenured basis the grievant would enjoy a priority over
other non-tenured but rated faculty members.
not a guarantee of tenure.

Clearly it was

As it turned out the grievantfs re-

appointment for the 1970-71 academic year became a matter of
tenure under the rules of the University.

Had he been reappoint-

ed he would have been granted tenure automatically.

If the
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University decided, as it did, not to grant him tenure, it
could not reappoint him.

I do not find that the action of the

Committee on Appointments in ranking the non-tenured faculty
was intended or can be construed implicitly to cover subsequent
..
appointments which carry automatic tenure.
Also, in the alternative, if the ratings of the Committee
on Appointments had a binding or precedential effect, it would
be on that or a successor Committee on Appointments.

Here the

Committee on Appointments which passed on the grievant's re-

appointment recommended his reappointment (and tenure) by a 3
~\o 2 vote. That can be construed a
of that Committee.

But it was the next higher level, namely

the P and B Committee which voted down the recommendation. Even
if the rating of the untenured faculty was binding on the
Committee that made it (the Committee on Appointments) I can
not find it binding on the higher level reviewing P and B
Committee.

In short either way I do not conclude that the de-

cision not to reappoint the grievant constituted either an
arbitrary or discriminatory disregard of the rated list of the
non-tenured members of the Department.
Nor can I find an arbitrary or discriminatory motive in
the appointment of a second non-tenured professor of Russian
with less seniority than the grievant.

Clearly there is no

rule or procedure which prohibits the University from doing so.
Professor Bormomshinov was not hired for no purpose at all.
He taught classes in Russian as did the grievant.

Had the

grievant been granted tenure, and had there been no need for
two professors of Russian, Professor Bormomshinov would have

- 5 been terminated.

So in that regard his employment was not

prejudicial to the grievant.

And even if Professor Bormomshinov

was hired in anticipation of the denial of tenure to the grievant, that reason and the plan to have another Russian professor
in readiness, could be as much a matter of "academic judgment"
(which is beyond the scope of this Arbitrator to rule on) as it
would be discriminatory or arbitrary.

In the absence of evi-

dence supporting the latter motive, and I find none in this
record, I cannot conclude that the bare hiring of Professor
Bormomshinov, even if in anticipation of the grievant's denial
of tenure, was any more than the consequence of an academic
judgment.
Finally, the University's declination of the grievant's
offer to accept reappointment for the 1970-71 academic year
on a non-tenured basis cannot be deemed an arbitrary or discriminatory procedural defect.

In point of time, because of

his prior contractural appointments, the University was obliged
to grant the grievant tenure had he been reappointed for the
1970-71 academic year.

The question before the University was

the reappointment of the grievant with tenure or not to reappoint him at all.
was"tenure or out."

In short under the University rules it
The University was not required to con-

tinue the grievant for an additional year on a non-tenured
basis.

Presumably it could have done so had it wished to. But

because it was not obliged to do so I cannot find that its
refusal or failure to do it constituted an improper procedural
decision.

- 6 For the foregoing reasons the denial of reappointment of
Professor Anexander Obolensky for the 1970-71 academic year
was not an arbitrary or discriminatory use of procedures.
grievance is denied.

I. Schmertz
Arbitrator

The

•

v '•
IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Pension
Fund;
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund
and

'
'
i
'
'
'
'
i
'

Award

!

Checker Garage Service Corp.

'
i

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman under the contract
between the above named parties, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the parties at a hearing on July 14,
1971, makes the following AWARD:
For half the month of January; the full month of
February; and as of March 1, 1971, Checker Garage
Service Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry Pension
Fund the total sum of $2477.52.
For half the month of January; the full month of
February and as of March 1, 1971, Checker Garage
Service Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund the total sum of $5780.90.
The above sums owed are past due.

Therefore Checker Gar-

age Service Corp. is directed to pay the above amounts to said
Funds forthwith with interest.
Eric/J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July 23, 1971
STATE OF New York ) SSt .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 23rd
and appeared Eric
be the individual
instrument and he

day of July, 1971, before me personally came
J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

